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Abstract
In Great Britain, electricity is traded in an energy-only market that relies upon 
bilateral trading until shortly before real time.  The GB System Operator also uses 
bilateral trading to respond to changes in demand and generation and resolve 
transmission constraints.  Prices are not explicitly spatial, although well-placed 
generators can charge the system operator more for their output.  This paper argues 
that these arrangements are not well-suited for the challenges of accommodating 
nearly thirty percent of intermittent wind generation, often located far from demand.  
The market design already implemented in the north-eastern United States is likely to 
be more efficient. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The electricity industry in Great Britain was liberalised in 1990, with a compulsory day-ahead 
spot market covering England and Wales.  This Electricity Pool was abolished in 2001, and 
replaced by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements, which evolved into the British 
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) in 2005, when they were extended 
to cover Scotland. 
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 The guiding principle of NETA’s (and hence BETTA’s) design was that electricity 
should be treated as much like a “normal” commodity as possible, while still recognising the 
physical characteristics of electricity.  This means that there is a balancing mechanism run by the 
system operator, National Grid, to ensure that demand and generation are kept in balance and 
transmission constraints are respected, but no other market was centrally organised.  Instead, 
most electricity was traded bilaterally (or internally, for integrated firms), with some trading on 
electronic exchanges to aid transparency.  A voluntary day-ahead auction has recently been 
introduced, but its turnover is low. 
 The introduction of NETA was controversial, with many academic commentators 
suggesting that the design was inferior to that of the Pool it replaced (Hogan, 2002; Newbery, 
1998; Wolfram, 1999).  Despite this, the market has operated smoothly for more than eight 
years, with only one significant failure to match generation to demand. 
 The question for this paper, however, is whether BETTA is well-suited for the challenges 
of the next decade or so.  The UK has accepted a target for renewable energy of 15% of its final 
energy consumption, as part of the European Union’s strategy of providing 20% of its energy 
from renewable sources by 2020.  Because it will be harder (or more expensive) to absorb this 
proportion of renewable energy in the (larger) sectors of heat and transport, it is likely that more 
than 30% of electricity will have to be from renewables if the UK is to meet its target.  Most of 
this is likely to come from wind energy. 
 Wind farms (and some other renewable energy generators) are intermittent sources, 
dependent on the strength of the wind.  When the amount of wind capacity is low, the variation 
in its output can just be seen as equivalent (if opposite) to variation in demand, and does not need 
to be separately managed.  With a large amount of wind capacity, however, the variation in its 
output must be explicitly managed, determining the amount of spinning reserve that the system 
controllers need to keep available, in case a sudden decrease in the wind raises the amount of 
electricity needed from other stations.  Furthermore, very little of the wind capacity can be relied 
on to meet the peak demand for power, and so the industry’s total capacity will need to reflect 
this, with many conventional power stations that rarely run, but are needed in case high demand 
for power coincides with low wind speeds.   
These are problems that can be managed, and while their costs are significant (Gross et 
al, 2006) they are not insurmountable.  The question for this paper is whether the current trading 
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arrangements used in Great Britain will be fit for purpose in this changed environment.  From 
this point of view, the trading and transmission arrangements must fulfil three key functions. 
• First, they must give generators the incentive to build new plants (or keep old ones open) 
if the capacity is needed, and not if it is not. 
• Second, they must make it possible for generators to connect plants to the grid in a timely 
manner, provided that the system can cope with the station’s output. 
• Third, they must promote efficient operation by the stations connected to the grid, so that 
the cheapest stations available generally produce as much as possible, while respecting 
transmission constraints and providing an adequate reserve for unexpected changes. 
The next section of this paper describes the current market and transmission access rules in Great 
Britain.  The third section discusses renewable generators and how they are supported in the UK.  
Section 4 discusses the challenges involved in creating and operating a low-carbon electricity 
system with a high proportion of renewable generation.  The succeeding sections ask whether the 
current market rules are well-suited to meet the three requirements set out above, and conclude 
that they are not.  The market design already used in parts of the United States offers a model 
which is more likely to achieve these tasks.  A brief conclusion sums up.  
 This paper does not describe the US market design in any detail – descriptions are 
available in many papers, including Bowring (2006) and Hogan (2002).  The focus of the paper 
is on the UK, but most EU countries use a similar system of power trading, in that the price of 
energy is the same across the whole country, and if transmission congestion occurs, the system 
operator has to resolve this by buying and selling power, outside the main markets.  To the extent 
that other EU countries have (or will have) large amounts of intermittent renewable generation, 
and that it is concentrated in particular areas remote from the main centres of demand, then they 
will face similar problems to those that this paper predicts the UK will have to deal with. 
 
2. The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
The formal rules of BETTA are set out in codes which cover different aspects of the relationship 
between generators, retailers and the transmission companies.  While most energy trading is 
bilateral, between generators and retailers, imbalances between their contractual and physical 
positions are inevitable, and the Balancing and Settlement Code sets out how these will be dealt 
with.  It also contains the rules for the Balancing Mechanism, through which National Grid, as 
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system operator, buys and sells power to keep the system secure.1  Changes to the codes are 
proposed by one or more companies, endorsed (or not) by an industry panel, and decided by the 
industry’s regulator (the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority), with the possibility of appeal if 
the regulator goes against the panel’s recommendation. 
 While most electricity trading is bilateral, “normal” bilateral trading must stop at Gate 
Closure, currently one hour before the start of each half-hour trading period.  Companies notify 
the system operator of their intended physical and contractual positions, having already provided 
indicative information to help with operational planning.  (To help with operational planning, 
they will already have provided indicative information on these.)  From this point onwards, only 
the system operator can initiate trades. 
 The system operator must ensure that demand and generation are kept in balance, and 
transmission constraints are respected, and does so by trading through the Balancing Mechanism.  
Generators can volunteer offers to supply power to the market, and bids to buy from it (which 
involve generating less), although participation is not compulsory, and some generators will 
submit prices at levels which makes it very unlikely that they will be accepted.  Large customers 
can also offer to supply power by reducing their demand on request.   
 The system operator will have to increase generation (and hence accept offers to sell 
power) if demand is unexpectedly high or if there are plant failures that reduce output.  To 
prepare for these, the system operator may also arrange for some stations to run part-loaded, able 
to increase output very rapidly, by selling back some of their output – it will then need to buy a 
similar amount of power from other stations to balance supply and demand.  If there is a 
transmission constraint, because the bilateral trades imply greater flows over one or more 
transmission lines than those lines can safely accept, then the system operator will also have to 
sell back some generation on the exporting side of the constraint, and buy an equal amount of 
power on the importing side. 
 At the end of each half-hour, the system operator’s total sales and purchases are added 
up.  If the system operator has had to buy more power than it sold back, then the system was 
short, and a System Buy Price will be calculated.  If the system operator was a net seller, then the 
                                                 
1 The other codes are the Grid Code, concentrating on technical requirements; the Connection and Use of System Code, which governs 
commercial terms for using the transmission system; and the System Operator – Transmission Owner Code, which governs the relationship 
between National Grid (in its role as GB System Operator) and the three companies which own transmission in Great Britain (National Grid 
itself, Scottish Power, and Scottish Hydro (part of Scottish and Southern Energy)). 
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system was long, and a System Sell Price will be computed.  To compute the System Buy (Sell) 
Price, the most expensive purchases (cheapest sales) are “tagged out” against the same volume of 
sales (purchases) – this is so that trades made to keep the system operating smoothly (providing 
spinning reserve and resolving constraints) do not affect the imbalance prices.  The System Buy 
(Sell) Price is then based on the average cost (revenue) of the next 500 MW of purchases (sales).  
Any market participant who is short of power when the system as a whole is short has to pay this 
price for its imbalance.  If a company has a surplus of power when the system is short, however, 
this is likely to help the system, and they now receive an imbalance price is now based on recent 
trades reported in the short-term markets.  In other words, if the industry turns out to be short of 
power, companies who need to buy more to cover an imbalance have to pay the price of the 
system operator’s purchases made on their behalf in the balancing mechanism, but those who 
had power to dispose of receive the same price that they might have been able to obtain in the 
short-term markets.  Buyers will always pay the System Buy Price, and sellers receive the 
System Sell Price, but the prices are calculated in different ways, depending on the overall 
balance.  
National Grid does not rely purely on the balancing mechanism to keep the system 
running smoothly.  It organises regular tenders for reserve plant and for other ancillary services.  
Some of the reserve is offered by large consumers – these tenders have been more successful in 
attracting demand side participation than the balancing mechanism.   
It should be noted that all electricity trading is carried out at a (notional) National 
Balancing Point, and so there is no geographical element to the System Buy Price, the System 
Sell Price or to bilateral trades.  There is an implicit geographical influence on trading in the 
Balancing Mechanism, in that the system operator will sometimes have to pay a relatively high 
price to a generator which is particularly well-placed to resolve a transmission constraint.  A 
generator which needs to buy back its power because it is on the exporting side of a constraint 
may be able to submit a particularly low price, but this signal of the low value of electricity at 
this site actually allows the generator to make an additional profit, assuming that it had earlier 
received full payment for its output.  This is the disadvantage of resolving congestion via a 
counter-trading mechanism. 
Congestion can be minimised if new generators are only connected to the transmission 
system when it is able to accept their output under most operating conditions.  This is the 
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principle that was followed by the system operator in offering connections in Great Britain.   The 
approach has been nick-named “invest then connect”, and requires applicants to wait until any 
reinforcement has been completed, so that adding the station to the grid would not lead to an 
increase in constraints.  The problem with the way this methodology has been applied is that it is 
based on the idea that the grid should be able to accept power from all the stations connected to it 
simultaneously.  It has not taken (sufficient) account of the fact that when the output from wind 
generators is high, this will crowd out production from conventional stations and the grid will not 
need to be able to accept both. 
The problem of the so-called “GB queue” has received political attention, since 
renewable generators wishing to connect to the grid in Scotland had been offered connection 
dates as late as 2023 (DECC, 2009a).  As a short-term measure, National Grid and the regulator 
agreed in 2008 to abandon their “first come-first served” approach, under which the earliest 
station to request capacity is given the first chance to connect to the grid once it is available.  
Instead, the company would prioritise those stations that appear best-positioned to actually use 
the capacity – in other words, those able to being construction first.   
The industry was unable to agree longer-term reforms, with competing proposals 
following the principle of “connect and manage”.  This would allow a generator to connect to the 
grid as soon as any local reinforcement works were completed, even if this would lead to an 
increase in constraints further away.  The industry failed to agree whether these costs should be 
socialised (charged to all consumers and generators) or targeted on generators in the area behind 
the constraint.  Not unnaturally, generators who wish to be (or are) located behind those 
constraints favoured a socialised approach, whereas most incumbents favoured targeting.  When 
the industry failed to make progress at a speed acceptable to its regulator, the matter was passed 
to the government for an imposed solution.  The government chose to socialise congestion costs, 
on the basis that this gave the best returns to renewable generators, and meeting the 
government’s target for renewable energy was more important than the possible increase in 
congestion costs that the socialised approach would entail.   
 
 
3. Policy for renewable generation in Great Britain 
The UK has a target of providing 15% of its energy from renewable sources in 2020.  The 
government’s low carbon transition plan (DECC, 2009b) envisages that 30% of the country’s 
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electricity should come from renewable generators in 2020.  The incentives to build the 
necessary capacity will not primarily come from the electricity market discussed in this paper – 
renewable generators receive substantial support from a feed-in tariff (for smaller schemes below 
5 MW in capacity) and from the so-called Renewables Obligation.  This is effectively a tradable 
green certificate scheme, which requires electricity retailers (suppliers, in British parlance) to 
surrender Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) equal to a set proportion of the power they 
sell, or pay a buy-out charge.  The buy-out payments are actually recycled to the retailers who 
have surrendered ROCs, in proportion to the number they surrender, which gives the certificates 
a value which increases as the amount of renewable generation falls short of the target (since 
each surrendered certificate attracts a greater amount of recycled buy-out payments), thus 
strengthening the incentive to invest.  Renewable generators receive ROCs for each MWh of 
power they produce, but the more expensive technologies can receive more than one ROC per 
MWh – wave and tidal generators receive 2 ROCs per MWh generated.  In contrast, generators 
using the gas given off by landfill (waste disposal) sites receive only 0.25 ROCs per MWh.     
Renewable generators that receive ROCs must also sell their power in the wholesale 
market for whatever price they can get.  The market rules are thus clearly relevant to the amount 
of revenue renewable generators can expect to receive, and hence the incentive to invest in 
renewable plant, but the government has the option of increasing the specific support given to 
renewable generators, rather than adjusting the general market rules, should the UK appear to be 
in danger of missing its targets.  For example, the government might raise the number of ROCs 
to be surrendered per MWh of electricity sold, which (by increasing the amount of buy-out 
payments to be recycled) would raise their value.  To support particular technologies, the 
government could also award them more ROCs per MWh of generation2 - which would have to 
be matched by an increase in the number of ROCs to be surrendered unless this support was to 
come at the expense of other technologies.  
 The possibility of increasing the support given to renewable generators makes it possible 
to separate decisions on market design from the question of whether we will meet our renewable 
generation targets.  The issues are whether changes to the market design will increase or decrease 
the resource cost of meeting those targets, and how they will affect customers’ payments and 
                                                 
2 In an example of this, a review of the increased costs of offshore wind turbines led the government to announce that offshore wind stations 
accredited to join the scheme between April 2010 and March 2014 will receive 2 ROCs per MWh of electricity generated throughout their 
twenty-year period of eligibility, instead of the 1.5 ROCs per MWh received by older stations (DECC, 2009c). 
8 
 
generators’ rents.  The broad thrust of this paper is that the price mechanism should be used to 
manage congestion, which is likely to reduce the net revenues of generators located in areas far 
from the market, such as Scotland.  Some projects, such as those at particularly windy sites, will 
go ahead anyway, and the lower revenues simply mean lower economic rents.  Other projects 
would be deterred by a change in market rules that lowered their (total) net revenues below their 
costs.  In normal circumstances, this would imply a more efficient use of resources, assuming 
that the new (and insufficient) revenues were a true reflection of the value of the project’s output.  
The problem is that if these projects are needed to meet the renewables targets, then the support 
given to those generators will have to be increased to offset the impact of the change in the 
market rules.  Unless the change in support can be targeted on those generators that really need 
it, consumers (or taxpayers) may have to increase their total payments by many times the 
amounts received by the marginal projects, and the extra money will increase the rents received 
by infra-marginal generators.  This should be seen, however, as an argument for targeting 
support, rather than for deliberately distorting the market rules to keep down the costs of 
untargeted support schemes. 
 
 
4. Challenges from renewable generation 
 Regardless of the extent to which generators depend on the wholesale market for their revenues 
(and smaller generators receiving the feed-in tariff will be completely insulated from it), their 
output will affect it.  This matters, because it is quite likely that the electricity system in Great 
Britain will have to absorb 30 GW of wind generation capacity if the UK is to meet its renewable 
energy target for 2020 (House of Lords, 2008, DECC, 2009b).  The fluctuations in output that 
this level of wind power would produce will be significantly larger than the UK has experienced 
in the past.  As a proportion of the local demand, they would be on the same scale as those 
produced by wind energy in Western Denmark, with the important difference that Denmark has a 
very large interconnection capacity to Norway and Sweden (with their largely hydro-electric 
power systems and ability to store water instead of generating) and to Germany. 
 These fluctuations will affect the industry in two main ways.  First, the industry’s 
conventional and nuclear plants will experience much greater hour-to-hour changes in demand, 
and will have to be operated to respond to these.  Figure 1 gives two duration curves for 
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simulations of these changes for 2020, based on data from Green and Vasilakos (2009).3  That 
paper took historic hourly demand and weather data for 13 years (1993 to 2005), scaled the 
underlying demand to possible 2020 levels, and estimated the output that 30 GW of wind 
generators distributed across Great Britain and its territorial waters, would produce.  While the 
dataset contains 13 sets of 8760 observations (and a few leap days), the curves presented here are 
scaled to the 8760 hours in a normal year.4  The appendix gives more detail on how these figures 
were derived. 
 
Figure 1. Hour-to-hour changes in electricity demand in Great Britain. 
 
The thinner line is based on the change in simulated gross demand between adjacent hours – that 
is, in the total load on the electricity system (assuming no demand response to the prices that 
might be produced).  These are effectively the changes that the industry has been coping with in 
the past (and could presumably continue to cope with), adjusted for the rising level of demand 
(which should be matched by rising capacity, and hence ability to change output).  The thicker 
line shows the hour-to-hour changes in the simulated net demand – that is the gross demand for 
electricity, less the simulated level of wind output.  Figure 1 clearly shows that the distribution of 
hour-to-hour changes in this net demand has been stretched – the absolute change at any point in 
the distribution is now greater.  This is particularly pronounced at the extremes – the greatest 
hourly changes have risen to – 13.7 GW and + 17.4 GW, compared to changes in the level of 
gross demand that never go beyond – 6.3 GW and + 10.1 GW.   
 What the figure does not show is the balance between anticipated and unanticipated 
changes in the net thermal demand.  If the changes are anticipated, then the market needs to 
provide incentives for generators to run in a manner that matches the pattern of demand for their 
output, but does not need to deal with sudden changes to this pattern.  To the extent that the 
changes in demand are not predictable, however, the market rules need to ensure that (enough) 
                                                 
3 The focus of that paper was on the range of market prices that might be produced, considering the impact of intermittent wind generation and of 
market power.  The paper used a supply function model to produce simulated prices, however, and abstracted from the issues of market design 
considered here.  
4 Effectively, once the calculations have been performed, the observations for all 13 years are ranked in order and every 13th observation is used 
in these charts. 
10 
 
generators will change their outputs quickly, in order to respond to the new pattern of demand.  
This could be a significantly greater challenge.  
 The scale of the second problem that comes from variable renewable output can be seen 
in figure 2.  This shows the industry’s load-duration curves, ranking hours in order of increasing 
demand.  The upper curve shows the number of hours for which the gross demand exceeds a 
given level, whereas the lower curve shows the duration of demands net of wind output, the load 
on conventional and nuclear plants.  Figure 3 gives a detail of the top end of figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Load-duration curve for Great Britain. 
 
Figure 3. Load-duration curve for Great Britain (detail). 
 
It is clearly the case that the number of hours for which net demand will be between 55 GW and 
65 GW has fallen significantly, even though the very peak demand is only slightly lower after 
subtracting the wind output.  The total capacity needed to meet the peak demand is therefore 
almost unchanged, but the amount of capacity that is only needed for a few hours a year, on 
average, is much higher.  The problem for market design is that this capacity will need to be 
properly remunerated, even though it will only run for a few hours a year, on average (less in 
some years, and more in others).   
The alternative would be to use some mechanism to ration demand to a lower level of 
available capacity.  The price mechanism is generally the most efficient way of doing this, giving 
some consumers a financial incentive to reduce their demand that reflects the cost of meeting it.  
System operators can also reduce the level of operating reserve that they hold (at the cost of 
raising the risk of a serious failure), serve less demand by supplying power at a lower voltage 
and, in extremis, cut off some customers.  This  may be a more efficient outcome than building 
so much capacity that it can always meet the (non price-sensitive) demand, but it should be clear 
that applying the price mechanism to demand could be expected to produce better results.  
The variability of wind output thus leads to two challenges – adjusting the output from 
conventional plant to match the more variable net demand for it, and paying for a greater volume 
of rarely needed reserve plant.  Gross et al (2006) have estimated that if up to 20% of British 
electricity came from variable renewable sources, the first of these would cost £2-3/MWh of 
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renewable output, and the second would cost £3-5/MWh.  The figures (even per MWh) are likely 
to increase with the proportion of renewable output – National Grid have suggested that short-
term balancing would cost the equivalent of £3-7 per MWh if the 2020 target is met (House of 
Lords, 2008). 
A third challenge comes, not from the variability of renewable output per se, but from its 
likely locations.  Renewable resources are not evenly distributed around the UK.  The best sites 
for onshore wind generation are in the north and the west, as are some offshore stations.  The 
bulk of these, however, will be in the North Sea, where shallower depths compensate for lower 
wind speeds than in the Western Approaches and the North Atlantic. 
This means that parts of the network will see some very large inflows of renewable 
power, and these are (mostly) a long way from the centres of demand in the Midlands and south 
of the UK.  If these inflows were constant over time, it would clearly be economic to reinforce 
the transmission system to handle the increased flows, or (if this was not possible) to retire other 
local generation to ensure that the lines are not actually constrained.  In practice, however, the 
flows vary over time, and the lines will not always be constrained.  It may not be economic to 
reinforce a transmission line that is only constrained for part of the time, or to close a station that 
is often able to get its power to consumers.  In that case, constraints on the system will increase, 
both in terms of number and the amount of energy that is affected. 
 
 
Figure 4. Load-duration curve for Scotland. 
 
Figure 4 gives an impression of this, subtracting the predicted wind output in Scotland from the 
simulated demand level for 2020.   (As described in the appendix, this is based on four years  for 
which we have detailed demand figures for Scotland and wind data, rather than the thirteen years 
underlying the other figures.)  For around 1,250 hours a year, the wind generation exceeds the 
demand in Scotland, implying that some power will have to be exported across the 
interconnector with England.  The capacity of that interconnector is due to rise to 3 GW, which 
implies that there will be 140 hours a year (on average) in which it would not be possible to 
export all the available power to England.  However, we should also consider the output from the 
2 GW of nuclear stations in Scotland – if they are still running on base load in 2020, this would 
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mean that exports of power were constrained as soon as the output from wind power exceeded 
local demand by 1 GW.  Furthermore, if it is necessary to keep some conventional plant running 
to allow a fast, local, response to changes on the system, this would tighten the constraint.  In 
other words, there could well be hundreds of hours a year in which it is not possible to export all 
of the wind output produced in Scotland, or to use it locally.  The system operator will have to 
manage this congestion, constraining off some Scottish wind generators and buying extra power 
from generators further south.  
 
5. Can BETTA lead to efficient operating decisions? 
Given the challenges that renewable generation will pose for the electricity system in Great 
Britain, will the current trading and transmission arrangements be able to cope?  While the set of 
tasks identified in section 1 ran in the order that decisions are made (from deciding to build 
capacity, to connecting it to the grid, to operating it), it is the operating decisions that ultimately 
determine the consequences of, and thus the incentives for, the earlier decisions, and we will 
consider those first. 
 How does BETTA fare at the task of ensuring the efficient operation of the stations 
connected to the network?  It relies on the power of arbitrage among the companies trading 
power.  Generators commit much of their capacity through bilateral trades made well in advance 
of real time, and it is unlikely that these would lead to a cost-minimising generating schedule – 
or even a feasible one in the presence of transmission constraints.  Minimising costs closer to 
real time depends on higher-cost generators being able to find lower-cost stations able to replace 
their output and to conclude a trade with them in the short-term markets, which, in Great Britain, 
trade relatively low volumes of power.  Furthermore, the incentive to avoid being penalised for a 
shortage of power when imbalances are settled still gives generators a reason to try to under-load 
their stations, increasing production costs. 
 BETTA’s other weakness is in the way in which transmission constraints are managed.  
National Grid trades in the Balancing Mechanism to ensure that the real-time dispatch does not 
breach any constraints, but is strongly discouraged from “trading energy”, with the implication 
that it must make as few trades as it can get away with.  This means that it has to avoid arbitrage 
between cheaper and more expensive generators, and does not take transmission losses into 
account when deciding on a re-dispatch.  Green (2007) estimates that the cost of not sending 
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efficient price signals to generators in England and Wales would have been around 0.1% of their 
turnover in 1996-7.5  This is a small proportion, but a large amount in absolute terms – and 
including Scotland in the market will have raised the level of transmission congestion as the 
interconnector with England has often been constrained.  In the near future, higher levels of 
renewable generation in Scotland will worsen the problem, and the net present value of 
congestion between 2010 and 2020 has been estimated at between £1 billion and £3.5 billion 
(Redpoint, 2010).6 
 It would not be cost-effective to build so much transmission capacity that all constraints 
were eliminated, and our target should be to use the capacity we have as efficiently as possible.  
The regulator has previously suggested that rights to use the transmission system should be 
auctioned to generators and then traded on a short-term basis so that those who were able to 
make best use of the grid would acquire the right to generate (Ofgem, 2001).  The underlying 
paradigm was that the price of energy should be the same all over the country, but that the price 
of transmission could vary.  Efficient trading of transmission access rights would have produced 
a price of power, net of the cost of acquiring transmission rights, which varied with the 
generator’s location and sent an accurate signal of the true value of electricity – had the idea 
been workable.  In practice, congestion could only be effectively managed via a very large 
number of different access rights, since a generator’s impact on a constraint can be very sensitive 
to its location, and markets in the individual rights (some only of interest to a handful of 
generators) could never be sufficiently liquid for an efficient trading-based solution to occur.   
 A more radical change would be to acknowledge that in an electrical network, the prices 
of energy and of transmission cannot in reality be disentangled.  The value of transmission 
between two points is the difference between the value of energy at one of those points and at the 
other.  If the price of energy at each point is set to equal this value – the marginal cost of 
producing it at points where this is possible, and the marginal cost of producing it somewhere 
else and moving it to the nodes without generation – then generators will have the correct 
incentives to increase or reduce output in ways that help the system operator avoid congestion. 
                                                 
5 The short-term cost of not sending price signals to consumers was much higher, at 1.2% of generators’ turnover. 
6 The lower estimate comes from Redpoint consulting, working for the government, while the higher estimate was by Frontier Economics, 
working for the regulator, Ofgem.  According to Redpoint, the spread in estimates is largely due to different assumptions about the amount of 
renewable capacity built in Scotland, and the speed with which the transmission system is reinforced. 
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 This means that the price of power must be calculated for every point on the system, but 
there are well-defined algorithms for doing so.  They have been used by three markets in the 
north-eastern United States for more than ten years.  The independent system operators in New 
England, New York and PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, but now covering a 
much wider area) all operate voluntary markets in which generators’ offers are used to calculate 
the marginal cost of power at each point on the network.  The day-ahead market accepts bids to 
buy power and offers to generate and provide reserve capacity for the following day, and the ISO 
calculates an operating schedule that maximises the net benefit from trading (i.e., the value of 
accepted bids less the value of accepted offers) while respecting constraints on generators’ 
operations and those on the transmission system.  The prices and quantities calculated are 
“financially firm”, committing traders to deliver or accept the amount of electricity involved.  If 
they cannot, a real-time market allows them to unwind those commitments, but at new prices 
calculated from revised bids and offers from those companies able to adjust their positions at 
short notice.  The markets are voluntary, and much power is traded bilaterally in advance, but the 
ISO markets are sufficiently liquid to be attractive to generators, ensuring an efficient dispatch. 
 One disadvantage of these markets is that the so-called locational marginal prices may 
well be volatile, since they incorporate variations in both the cost of electricity and of 
transmission.  If there is congestion on the transmission system, the price in the exporting area 
will fall, and the price in the importing area will rise, reflecting the need to rely on relatively 
expensive local generation.  However, that volatility can be hedged, first with the standard 
forward and futures contracts that guarantee the price of power at a central location, and second 
with Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) that lock in the price difference between such a 
central location and the holder’s own site.  The power that is moved from an exporting node to 
an importing one will pay a transmission charge equal to the difference in prices between them, 
and the revenue from this will go to the transmission system operator.  This makes the system 
operator the natural counter-party to an FTR.  Instead of receiving the (volatile) actual price 
difference when power is moved over the grid, the system operator returns it to the generator, 
receiving a more predictable income (from initially selling the FTRs) in exchange.  
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6. Can BETTA lead to efficient connection decisions? 
The second task identified in this paper is to ensure that generators can be connected to the 
system in an efficient manner.  In one way, it is easy to assess the performance of the 
arrangements used so far – they have been tried and found wanting.  However, this should lead 
us to consider the government’s proposed alternative, even though it has not yet been 
implemented.  To reiterate, generators will be allowed to connect to the transmission system as 
soon as any local work has been completed, even if this would worsen transmission constraints 
elsewhere.  The system operator will have to incur the costs of counter-trading to manage these 
constraints, and will pass them on to all consumers and generators (who are also likely to pass 
them through to consumers in the power price).  Modelling done for the government suggests 
that this will allow enough generators to connect to the system for the UK to meet its targets for 
renewable electricity generation, but will also lead to an increase in congestion costs.  The 
predicted increase in these costs is extremely sensitive to the rate at which renewable generation 
is connected in Scotland (in particular) and at which transmission capacity can be expanded.7 
 The thrust of these reforms is to ensure that generators have no reason to avoid areas that 
are likely to be transmission constrained.8  This will not lead to efficient connection decisions.  
Efficiency requires that generators face the economic consequences of their decisions, and hence 
that net generation revenues are lower in transmission-constrained areas; either because 
transmission charges are higher or because electricity prices are lower.  In some cases, this may 
not affect the generator’s decision, because the local renewable resource is so good that this 
outweighs the difference in transmission costs, but if the generator does not face those 
transmission costs, the question will never be asked.   
 A system based on nodal pricing would automatically give generators the correct signals 
about the relative merits of different points of connection – if they choose to locate in an area 
with frequent constraints, the price they receive will be lower, on average.  There are two 
political problems with this approach.  First, it will tend to increase the level of financial support 
needed by renewable generators (even if it reduces the resource cost of accommodating them).  
This would either reduce the amount of generation built, or raise the cost of the support scheme.  
                                                 
7 Redpoint (2010) report a central scenario with an increase in constraint costs of £195 million (in net present value, from 2010 to 2020), whereas 
Frontier (2009) estimate an increase of £1.7 billion, comparing their central cases. 
8 Generators do currently have an incentive to locate at sites where they may ease congestion, because they will be able to earn more in the 
Balancing Mechanism for resolving it. 
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The way to minimise the impact on support costs would be to ensure that the support scheme is 
very carefully targeted on the generators who really need help, rather than the current 
mechanisms which offer the same support to all generators using a particular technology, 
wherever they are sited.  In the 1990s, renewable generators had to compete for individual 
contracts in a series of tender rounds, and this might be a better option for minimising the cost of 
support.   
The second problem is that generators already located in an export-constrained area (or 
one that is potentially constrained) will see their net revenues fall as capacity is added and the 
constraint binds more often.  One solution to this problem would be to issue long-term Financial 
Transmission Rights to these generators, allowing them to “lock in” the prices they expected to 
receive before any entry took place.  The seller of these FTRs would expect to lose money, so 
would have to be compensated, either via a levy on all consumers, or by issuing similar (but 
profitable) FTRs covering areas where prices were expected to rise in future (and forcing 
generators currently sited there to accept them).  Because FTRs are financial contracts, giving 
payments whether or not the holder is actually generating power, they would not affect the 
incentives for efficient operation or plant closure decisions.  If the local power prices are 
insufficient to cover a station’s (non-sunk) costs, then the station should close, and the capacity it 
was using would become available to other generators. 
 
7. Can BETTA lead to efficient capacity decisions? 
The first task identified in section 1 was to give generators the incentives to keep the right 
amount of capacity available to the market.  BETTA can be portrayed as an energy-only market, 
relying on the prospect of high energy prices to incentivise generators to make plant available.  
In theory, such a market can provide the right incentives, particularly if there is sufficient 
demand side participation, and prices rise well above the variable costs of the most expensive 
generators.  Most trading under BETTA is bilateral and conducted well in advance, and prices 
should be higher at times when traders expect the demand on thermal stations to be high.  
Trading well in advance, however, they will not be able to predict exactly when low wind 
outputs and high demands create the greatest need for thermal plant.  At those times, short-term 
trades just before Gate Closure and National Grid’s actions in the Balancing Mechanism will be 
needed to keep the system in balance.  If generators can see the extreme need for their plant, they 
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will be able to raise the prices they offer, receiving sufficient revenues.  If generators are taken 
by surprise, they may not be able to adjust their offers to maximise their revenues.  In either case, 
most generators are not going to trade in the Balancing Mechanism, but the incentive properties 
of an energy-only market require them to receive the same expected revenue.  This depends on 
effective arbitrage between the prices for bilateral trades and those in the Balancing Mechanism 
and for imbalances. Furthermore, even in the well-organised (and centralised) US markets, prices 
have not risen to (or stayed at) the levels needed to cover generators’ fixed costs, largely because 
the system operators suppress prices by behaviour such as buying some of their requirements 
“out of the market” (Joskow, 2008).   
 In practice, BETTA is not a pure energy-only market.  National Grid also buys a 
significant amount of reserve capacity from generators and large consumers through regular 
tender rounds (3 of these were held during 2009).  Again, arbitrage between these auctions and 
the other energy markets should ensure that prices in bilateral trades rise to reflect the 
opportunity cost of not being able to participate in the system operator’s tenders, and those 
generators not selected by National Grid are able to receive an equivalent amount of revenue if 
they are selling energy.   
 The problem with this approach is that most generators will only be able to recover their 
fixed costs if this arbitrage between markets works well, or if market power in the wholesale 
market raises prices above marginal costs.  Relying on market power to ensure sufficient 
capacity is not an advisable policy, especially as firms can have incentives to keep capacity out 
of the market in order to reduce reserve margins and bolster their market power (Crampes and 
Creti, 2005).  The combination of an energy-only market, reserve auctions and arbitrage may 
produce sufficient incentives for the right amount of capacity, but the costs of having too little 
generation are high. 
 The regulator is aware of the risks in relying on an energy-only market to remunerate 
plant that may not run very often, and has considered the issue as part of the so-called Project 
Discovery, an assessment of the future of Britain’s energy markets (Ofgem, 2010).  This has 
concluded that there are significant risks to security of supply in the years approaching 2020, 
given the amount of investment needed to replace retiring power stations and raise the level of 
renewable output.  Several options for reform have been raised, one of which is to have long-
term tenders for low-carbon generation, coupled with shorter-term (perhaps annual) tenders for 
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conventional capacity.  If each station awarded a contract through the long-term tenders received 
its own tender price, this would allow support to be targeted to the amount actually needed to 
make that project viable.  That would reduce the rents received by generators in favourable 
locations and make it possible to target transmission costs on the generators causing them 
without making it more difficult (or expensive) to meet renewables targets.   
 The short-term tenders could form an annual capacity market, which is another feature of 
some US power markets (Cramton and Stoft, 2008).  They aim to ensure that generators have 
sufficient incentive to keep capacity available to meet the expected demand, plus reserve needs.  
Retailers have to buy capacity to cover their own customers’ needs in annual auctions held three 
or four years in advance.  The long interval means that entrants as well as incumbents can 
sensibly bid, since there is time to build a new plant, with several years’ payments secured (if an 
entrant wishes).  In return for the payments from the capacity market, generators offer a financial 
hedge against energy prices, ensuring that they do not gain from both the capacity and the energy 
markets, and giving them a strong incentive to be available to generate when they are most 
needed.  Ofgem’s discussion of the short-term tenders explicitly draws on US experience (2010, 
pp.45-7), suggesting that it could be an answer to the challenges faced by the UK.  The regulator 
has not yet concluded that capacity tenders are the right answer, and is consulting on both some 
more limited reforms (finding ways to set higher energy and reserve prices when the market is 
tight) and on the possibility of setting up a Central Energy Buyer which would decide what 
capacity should be built.  This would be a radical departure from the policies of the past twenty 
years, and would be premature, given that market-based solutions exist and are working well 
elsewhere  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper considers the task of integrating a high proportion of intermittent renewable 
generation into the British electricity market.  It concludes that the current rules are inefficient at 
resolving congestion, may not provide sufficient incentive to make capacity available to meet 
short-lived peaks in the demand for it, and have not been able to accommodate the queue of 
entrants wishing to connect to the grid in Scotland.  A better approach would be to allow the 
price of power to vary across the country, reflecting the true state of the transmission system and 
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giving incentives to reduce generation and investment in constrained areas.  This approach has 
been used for over ten years in a number of US power markets.  More recently, some of these 
markets have developed capacity markets which increase the incentives to ensure that enough 
generation is available to meet demand.  The US markets thus address all of the major problems 
facing the UK, and provide a “ready-made package” of reforms.  Making such significant 
changes to the British wholesale market would require strong political leadership, but might 
greatly ease the tasks of creating and operating our future electricity system. 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
This research is funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council and our 
industrial partners, via the Supergen Flexnet Consortium, Grant Number EP/E04011X/1. It has 
also received support from Advantage West Midlands and the European Regional Development 
Fund, via the Birmingham Science City Energy Efficiency Project.   I would like to thank the 
editors and two anonymous referees, and the organisers and participants at the IFN and Elforsk 
Conferences on Market Design, Sweden, September 2009 for helpful comments.  The views 
expressed are mine alone. 
 
 
References 
Bowring, J. (2006) “The PJM Market” in (eds.) F.P. Sioshansi and W. Pfaffenberger (2006) 
Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective, pp. 451-77, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier 
Crampes, C. and A.Creti (2005) “Capacity Competition in Electricity Markets”, Economia delle 
fonti di energia e dell’ambiente, no. 2, pp. 59-83 
Cramton, P. and S. Stoft (2008) “Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, 
More Efficiency”, Utilities Policy, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 194-201 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2009a) Improving Grid Access: Consultation 
Document, URN 09D/740 London, Department of Energy and Climate Change 
20 
 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2009b) The UK Renewable Energy Strategy, Cm 
7686, London, The Stationery Office 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2009c) Government Response to the 2009 
Consultation on the Renewables Obligation, Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
London, URN 09D/847 
Frontier Economics (2009) An assessment of the potential impact on consumers of connect and 
manage access proposals: A report prepared for Ofgem, November 2009, London, 
Frontier Economics 
Green, R.J. (2007) “Nodal Pricing of Electricity: How much does it cost to get it wrong?” 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 31, no.2, pp. 125-149  
Green, R.J. and N. Vasilakos (2010) “Market Behaviour with Large Amounts of Intermittent 
Generation” Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 7, pp. 3211-3220 
Gross, R., P. Heptonstall, D. Anderson, T.C. Green, M. Leach and J. Skea (2006) The Costs and 
Impacts of Intermittency: An assessment of the evidence on the costs and impacts of 
intermittent generation on the British electricity network, London, Imperial College 
Hogan, W.W. (1992) “Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission”, Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, vol 4, no 2, September, pp 211-242 
Hogan, W.W. (2002) “Electricity Market Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms” Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 103-132 
House of Lords (2008) The Economics of Renewable Energy, Economic Affairs Select Committee 
Fourth Report of Session 2007-8, HL195 of 2007-8, London, The Stationery Office 
Joskow, P.L. (2008) “Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design”, 
Utilities Policy, vol. 16, pp. 159-170  
Newbery, D.M. (1998) “The Regulator's Review of the English Electricity Pool” Utilities Policy, 
vol. 7 no 3, pp.129-142 
Ofgem (2001) Transmission Access and Losses Under NETA: Consultation Document May 
2001, 37/01, London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
Ofgem (2010) Project Discovery - Options for delivering secure and sustainable energy 
supplies, 16/10 London, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
21 
 
Redpoint (2010) Improving Grid Access: Modelling the Impacts of the Consultation Options A 
report on a study for the Department of Energy and Climate Change, URN 10D/549, 
London, Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Wolfram, C. (1999) “Electricity Markets: Should the Rest of the World Adopt the United 
Kingdom’s Reforms?” Regulation, Vol. 22 (4): pp.48-53 
 
 
Appendix – simulated load-duration curves 
The load-duration curves in this paper are intended to illustrate the scale of the problems that the 
electricity industry may face, rather than to provide definitive quantitative predictions.  They are 
based on data used in Green and Vasilakos (2009).  The starting point was thirteen years of 
hourly electricity demand data, from between 1993 and 2005, taken from National Grid’s web 
site.  Each year (in turn) was scaled up to a predicted level for 2020, assuming future demand 
growth of 1.1% a year, and basing the scaling on annual weather-adjusted energy consumption.  
In other words, hour-to-hour demand variations due to weather conditions are preserved (and 
will be matched to the wind output that those weather conditions would produce).  The procedure 
also preserves the underlying load shape for each year.  As household, industrial and commercial 
consumption each have their own patterns, and their proportions have changed over our sample 
period (and are likely to change in future), this is a short-coming of our methodology.  However, 
to correct for this, we would need hourly data on demand by customer type, which are not 
readily available.  The impact of the relative reduction in industrial demand, however, with its 
(typically) high load factor, will be to make the true 2020 load duration curve peakier than the 
curves presented here.  That would strengthen the arguments in this paper.  In the longer term, it 
is possible that “smart” charging of electric vehicles could flatten the load-duration curve – as 
long as the market design is capable of sending signals of the best times to do this. 
The simulated hourly wind outputs were based on wind speed data from the British 
Atmospheric Data Centre.  Individual weather stations were used to represent 19 onshore and 11 
offshore regions, with capacities assigned to them in proportion to the amounts being planned (or 
built, or existing) in the British Wind Energy Association database.  The aggregate outputs were 
based on 11 GW of onshore capacity and 19 GW offshore.  Some missing observations were 
filled in by interpolation or regression against the wind speeds at nearby weather stations 
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(including those not used to represent wind regions).  The regional output, given the capacity 
assigned, was based on a standard wind turbine power curve.  Some wind speeds were scaled up 
or down by (individual) constant percentages in order to produce realistic load factors for those 
sample stations – weather stations are often at sites that would be unsuitable for a wind 
generator, even if they are in a generally favourable region.9  Wind speeds from coastal weather 
stations were also scaled up to obtain suitable average load factors from offshore wind stations.  
If these average load factors are too high (or too low), then the industry will have to build more 
(or less) capacity to meet its output targets, implying that any errors in our load factors will be 
offset in terms of the total output generated – at least on an annual basis.  More details on the 
procedures used are in Green and Vasilakos (2009). 
We thus have 13 annual series for demand and for wind generation, each scaled to 
possible overall totals for consumption and for wind capacity in 2020.  Our aggregate load-
duration curve for the gross demand, shown in figures 2 and 3, is summed across these 13 years.  
The net demand on thermal plant (in the same figures) is obtained by subtracting the simulated 
wind output for each hour from the simulated demand in that hour.  Once again, the 13 years of 
simulated net demands are aggregated to give the load-duration curve.  Note that that the point 
on the gross load-duration curve for the 1,000th highest hour, which corresponds to the 13,000th 
highest value in the dataset, will be for an hour that is extremely unlikely to also have the 
13,000th highest net demand.  In other words, points on the two load-duration curves that are 
vertically aligned will generally correspond to different clock hours, and if the same hours were 
used for both curves, one would be far from monotonic. 
In figure 1, we present the hour-to-hour changes in demand, both gross and net of the 
(corresponding) change in wind output.  In other words, the gross changes series ranks the 
changes between adjacent hours of the gross demand series described above, while the net 
changes series ranks the changes between adjacent hours of the net demand series.  As before, 
two vertically aligned points will not (in general) correspond to the same hour. 
Finally, figure 4 gives the load-duration curves for Scotland.  These are based on four 
years of data from April 2001, as this was the earliest date for which National Grid publishes 
detailed Scottish demand data, and our wind dataset ends before a fifth year is completed.  The 
                                                 
9 For example, weather stations at RAF bases typically had the most complete runs of data (which was helpful), but airfields need to be on large 
areas of flat land, whereas wind farms are often sited on top of hills. 
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demand data was scaled to possible 2020 levels by the same factors used for figures 1-3, and it 
was straightforward to split our wind generation series between Scotland and the rest of Great 
Britain.  There was no attempt to calculate different scaling factors for Scottish demand – the 
aim of the figures in this paper is simply to illustrate the approximate scale of the problems 
facing the industry in ten years’ time.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Hour-to-hour changes in Electricity Demand in Great Britain  
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Figure 2.  Load-duration curve for Great Britain   
 
Figure 3.  Load-duration curve for Great Britain (detail)  
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Figure 4.  Load-duration curve for Scotland  
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